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The field of white-collar/corporate crime has been studied by
scholars from many disciplinary fields. Yet, the ambiguity and
complexity of the subject, dearth ofprogram and policy evaluation, poor
or inaccessible data and lack of systematic empirical research has
precluded any consensus about its causes or what can be done to prevent
and control it. Concern about the global financial crisis of 2008 and its
association with fraudulent activities in the mortgage and securities
markets has brought white-collar crime back to the forefront of
criminological inquiry. New research-particularly evidence-based
criminology and criminal justice and vignette studies of corporate
crime-has provided insight into some of the longstanding debates in the
field while also revealing new and interesting puzzles for scholars to
explore. These new developments are summarized along with
suggestions for new research on mortgage fraud, including the
revitalization of a "criminogenic tier" approach to organizational
actors, firms, and markets, and the use of network analysis as a means to
map and measure key ties among fraudsters, network centrality, and
reach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Criminologists and legal scholars have defined and classified white-collar
crime in a variety of different ways.' Two general types of white-collar crimes are
discussed in this paper-those committed by companies and their managers to
"achieve the goals of the business" (corporate crimes) and offenses committed by
individuals that may or may not involve organizational or business resources, but
tend to be tied more to self-interest (e.g., embezzlement or income tax fraud).
Most remarks in this paper center around corporate crime, but the intersection of
the two types, especially in the area of mortgage fraud, is of particular interest.
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Thinking about corporate crime requires recognition that both organizations
and individuals may be illegal actors and potential targets for crime prevention and
control (sanctions). It also necessitates familiarity with Edwin Sutherland's
argument that the traditional conception of crime and justice, with its exclusive
focus on criminal law and criminal justice, is too narrow to capture the behaviors
of interest.2 In this paper, I follow Sutherland's lead by adopting a broad definition
of corporate crime that includes organizational behavior proscribed by criminal,
civil, and regulatory law and administered by the appropriate system of justice.
Several years ago, in an essay published in the Newsletter of the American
Society of Criminology, I noted that the content and treatment of white-collar
crime in most sociology/criminology textbooks had changed very little over the
past decades.3 I linked this stagnation to three interrelated problems: (1) white-
collar crime research is rarely sponsored and funded; (2) the historical dominance
of radical/critical epistemological approaches that are often at odds with
positivistic criminology; and (3) the subject matter is complex and difficult to
study.
After the 2008 global financial crisis-brought about in large part by
mortgage, insurance, and securities frauds-white-collar crime scholars were
hopeful that the government would declare one of its infamous "crime wars" and
white-collar/corporate crime would finally get the attention and funding it
deserves. With a few exceptions, however, we have been disappointed. Even if
the political will to prioritize white-collar crime was in place, unresolved data and
methods problems limit both the direction and degree of progress that can be
achieved.
In the next section, some of the major problems confronting white-collar
crime researchers (especially those related to data and measurement) are
highlighted. This is followed by a review of what has been learned from evidence-
based approaches and recent vignette studies about corporate crime
prevention/control, along with current knowledge gaps. The section concludes
with several promising directions for further conceptual and empirical white-collar
crime work, including: (1) fraud, foreclosures, and neighborhood crime; (2)
criminogenic tiers; and (3) network analysis of mortgage fraud participants.
II. MAKING SENSE OF THE LITERATURE
A. Data Limitations
Calculating estimates of crime incidence and prevalence generally is a
difficult task. But, unlike traditional street crime, the task here is even more
troublesome. It is difficult to measure white-collar crime because all of the typical
2 EDwIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 6 (1949).
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sources of crime data (including official data, offender self-reports, and
victimization reports) are limited in scope, not collected in a systematic manner, or
have unique problems that discourage operationalization and generalization.
Some of the better known studies of white-collar and corporate crime have
used some kind of "official" data to assess crime incidence and prevalence.
Sometimes, cases are collected at the far end of the justice process (e.g.,
"convicted" offenders).4  Other researchers rely on "arrest/case" data or a
combination of sources.' For instance, in their study of frauds in the savings and
loan industry, Calavita, Tillman, and Pontell used criminal referral data.6 In My
work, I have supplemented case data (criminal, civil, and administrative "arrests"
and "resolved" case decisions) with information gleaned from interviews, company
self-reports (Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Discharge Monitoring
Reports), and survey data (in particular, factorial surveys that include hypothetical
scenarios that measure managers' offending "intentions"). Still other researchers
extrapolate crime estimates from known incidents and case studies.8 All of these
data sources have severe limitations which are likely to produce highly biased
crime incidence and prevalence estimates.
The Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) contain arrest data on white-collar crime,
including fraud, forgery/counterfeiting, embezzlement, and all other offenses.9
Data elements within these categories can be broken down by the sex, age, and
race of the arrestee.'o The UCR are not very helpful in studying corporate crime
4 E.g., DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES: WHITE-COLLAR
OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS XV (1991). See also SUTHERLAND, supra note 2, at 3-5; BRIAN
FORST & WILLIAM RHODES, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING IN EIGHT UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS, 1973-1978, INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL RESEARCH STUDY
No. 8622 (3rd ed. 1990), available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cgi-bin/file?comp
=none&study-8622&ds=0&fileid=744550.
E.g., MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME xi, app. at 329-50
(1980).
6 K. Calavita, R. Tillman & H.N. Pontell, The Savings and Loan Debacle, Financial Crime,
and the State, 23 ANN. REV. Soc. 19, 20-21 (1997).
See, e.g., Sally S. Simpson, The Decomposition of Antitrust: Testing a Multi-Level,
Longitudinal Model of Profit-Squeeze, 51 AM. Soc. REV. 859, 862-65 (1986) [hereinafter Simpson,
Decomposition ofAntitrust]; SALLY S. SIMPSON, CORPORATE CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 16-
20, app. at 163-73 (2002) [hereinafter SIMPSON, CORPORATE CRIME]; Sally S. Simpson, Joel Garner
& Carole Gibbs, Final Technical Report: Why Do Corporations Obey Environmental Law?
Assessing Punitive and Cooperative Strategies of Corporate Crime Control 6-7 (2007), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/220693.pdf.
8 See, e.g., Raymond J. Michalowski & Ronald C. Kramer, The Critique ofPower, in STATE-
CORPORATE CRIME: WRONGDOING AT THE INTERSECTION OF BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT I (Raymond
J. Michalowski & Ronald C. Kramer eds., 2006); DAVID R. SIMON, ELITE DEVIANCE 97-131 (8th ed.
2006).
9 Cynthia Barnett, The Measurement of White-Collar Crime Using Uniform Crime Reporting
(UCR) Data, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/nibrs/nibrswcc.pdf (last
visited Mar. 18, 2011).
10 Id
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because: most cases are not investigated and recorded by the police per se; the data
elements are limited and thus lack utility for purposes of theory development or
testing; and little is known about how representative arrested offenders are of the
more general offending population. The National Incident-Based Reporting
System (NIBRS) may yield more promise than the UCR data, as it captures more
offense types and has the ability to drill down to incident characteristics (including
location type, property description, and type of victim)." However, NIBRS data
also are limited to known criminal incidents. In the case of white-collar crime,
discovery by the police is problematic for a number of reasons-not the least of
which is that the victim is often unaware that a crime has occurred.12 Critics also
speculate that the data are likely to be biased downward (from executives to less
powerful employees, away from companies to individuals as criminal actors).' 3
In addition to the UCR and NIBRS, other "official" data are available from
state and federal court records. The U.S. Sentencing Commission, for instance,
collects information about "organizational" offenders sentenced under Chapter 8 of
the Sentencing Guidelines.14 These data have been reported yearly since 1991
when the Sentencing Guidelines were promulgated. Data elements describe: (1)
the organizational offender (including structure, size, and economic viability); (2)
the type of offense for which the firm was convicted; (3) the mode of case
adjudication; (4) the type of sanctions imposed (including probation and court-
ordered compliance programs); and (5) how the sentencing guidelines were
applied. 5 Despite an uneven start,'6 the sentencing data provide a useful window
to the types of cases brought in and the sentencing practices of the federal courts.
But, given the biases associated with how cases are moved into and through
criminal court, the portrait that emerges from the data about organizational
offenders is far from representative of the unknown corporate offender (i.e., the
dark figure of corporate crime).
Corporate offending statistics also are collected by regulatory agencies, such
as the EPA, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). Although more of these data are readily available
today than in the past,'7 agency data are not "systematic" across sources. Agencies
" Id. at 2--6.
12 Id. at 6.
1 See, e.g., WILLIAM S. LAUFER, CORPORATE BODIES AND GUILTY MINDS: THE FAILURE OF
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 139-44 (2006).
14 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2008 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS iV
(2008), available at http://ftp.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2008/SBTOC08.htm.
'5 Id.
16 Analyses of the data collected prior to 1994 revealed that information was incomplete and
likely biased toward smaller and newer companies. See Cindy R. Alexander, Jennifer Arlen & Mark
A. Cohen, Evaluating Trends in Corporate Sentencing: How Reliable Are the US Sentencing
Commission's Data?, 13 FED. SENT'G REP. 108, 108-09 (2000).
" RONALD G. BURNS & MICHAEL J. LYNCH, ENvIRONMENTAL CRIME: A SOURCEBOOK 2
(2004).
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have different discovery mechanisms, case processing decision structures, and case
outcomes which negatively affect data comparisons across regulatory bodies. Like
police statistics, regulatory data also require "official" discovery. Agencies may
learn about violations in a variety of proactive and reactive ways, including:
inspections and audits; victim, competitor, and citizen complaints; referrals from
police; and self-reports. Again, systematic biases are suspected but the degree of
bias and its direction is virtually unknown. In general, there has been little
assessment of data reliability.
There also are several national surveys that track victimization, reporting
practices, and public opinion about white-collar crime (e.g., The National Public
Survey of White-Collar Crime'8 ). Questions tend to focus on more traditional
white-collar and not corporate offenses, on victimization and not offending.
Coupled with sampling difficulties and low response rates, the generalizability of
survey findings is questionable. Consequently, nearly seventy-two years after
Sutherland's seminal work,' 9 the "hidden" figure of white-collar and corporate
crime remains cloaked in mystery.
B. Conclusions, Puzzles, and Unresolved Issues
Although most scholarship in the field tends to be more conceptual and
qualitative in nature, the few systematic quantitative studies that have been
conducted have produced some uniform findings: (1) the amount of white-collar
and corporate crime is extensive; (2) a large percent of offenders are recidivists;
(3) similar to street offenders, a small number of offenders account for the bulk of
offending; and (4) in some regulatory arenas (such as the environment), most
regulated companies generally are law-abiding. 20 Many even over-comply. 2 1 This
led some scholars to suggest that earlier command and control regimes have
achieved a high level of success among the large, industrial point-source polluters
1 RODNEY HUFF, CHRISTIAN DESILETS & JOHN KANE, NAT'L WHITE COLLAR CRIME CTR., THE
2010 NATIONAL PUBLIC SURVEY ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME (2010), available at
http://crimesurvey.nw3c.org/docs/nw3c2010survey.pdf; JOHN KANE & APRIL D. WALL, NAT'L WHITE
COLLAR CRIME CTR., THE 2005 NATIONAL PUBLIC SURVEY ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME (2006),
available at http://www.nw3c.org/research/sitefiles.cfn?fileid=b3dlbadb-51ca-4acf-bd34-fdeb6b
7a4efl&mode=p; DONALD J. REBOVICH & JENNY LAYNE, NAT'L WHITE COLLAR CRIME CTR., THE
NATIONAL PUBLIC SURVEY ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME (2000), available at http://www.nw3c.org/
research/site files.cfm?fileid=ec2dd297-30bd-4dl2-9465-85874al7b3fd&mode=p.
'9 Edwin H. Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, 5 AM. Soc. REv. 1 (1940).
20 CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 5, at xi; SUTHERLAND, supra note 2, at 3-6, 17-28;
Michael L. Benson & Elizabeth Moore, Are White-Collar and Common Offenders the Same? An
Empirical and Theoretical Critique of a Recently Proposed General Theory of Crime, 29 J. RES.
CRIME & DELINQ. 251, 264 (1992); Simpson, Decomposition of Antitrust, supra note 7, at 859-62,
871-72.
21 Simpson, Garner & Gibbs, supra note 7, at 127.
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and that it is time to focus attention on non-industrial sources of environmental
pollution and other risk creators (including small businesses and individuals).22
Although there are a number of studies that examine individual, firm, and
organizational characteristics, research results in these areas are still equivocal.23
Findings regarding the relationship between offending and characteristics such as
firm size, diversity, profitability, the age of facilities, and so forth often report
contradictory relationships.24 We know little about the spatial distribution of
white-collar crimes and even less about the psychology of white-collar offenders,
although more is known about the individual white-collar offender who gets
caught than the "corporate criminal."25
More detailed studies of chronic offenders and how they are similar and
different from low-level or non-offenders would be helpful from both a theoretical
and policy perspective. A criminal career approach has already been utilized with
some success looking at individual white-collar offenders.26 A life course
approach applied to corporations, with data that tracks within-company change,
would provide a better understanding of criminogenic processes over time.
The question of over-compliance is an interesting one, but little is known
about this phenomenon, also known as "extreme volunteerism."27 Do managers in
these firms consistently share pro-social norms and values? Are these norms and
values organizational, individual, or does a confluence of the two produce extreme
volunteers? Do extreme volunteer firms have stronger internal compliance
systems that socialize, discover, and sanction ethical lapses? Or, do
companies/managers over-comply for instrumental reasons (i.e., out of economic
self-interest)?
22 Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regulated Entity in
the New Era ofEnvironmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 517-18, 526 (2004).
23 See, e.g., CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 5, app. E at 340-41, app. I at 349-50; WEISBURD
ET AL., supra note 4, at 176-80; Marie A. McKendall & John A. Wagner III, Motive, Opportunity,
Choice and Corporate Illegality, 8 ORG. SC. 624, 644 (1997); Simpson, Decomposition ofAntitrust,
supra note 7, at 859-60.
24 See, e.g., Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, New Evidence on the Origin of Corporate
Crime, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 421, 432-33 (1996); Don Sherman Grant II, Andrew W.
Jones & Albert J. Bergesen, Organizational Size and Pollution: The Case of the U.S. Chemical
Industry, 67 AM. Soc. REV. 389, 391-94,402-04 (2002).
25 DAVID WEISBURD, EuN WARING & ELLEN F. CHAYET, WITE-COLLAR CRIME AND
CRIMINAL CAREERS 5-6 (2001).
26 Nicole Leeper Piquero & David Weisburd, Development Trajectories of White-Collar
Crime, in THE CRIMINOLOGY OF WMTE-COLLAR CRIME 153, 155 (Sally S. Simpson & David
Weisburd eds., 2009); see also MICHAEL L. BENSON, CRIME AND THE LIFE COURSE: AN INTRODUCTION
151-57 (2002); WEISBURD, WARING & CHAYET, supra note 25, at 31-32; Nicole Leeper Piquero &
Michael L. Benson, White-Collar Crime and Criminal Careers: Specifying a Trajectory of
Punctuated Situational Offending, 20 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JusT. 148, 155-56 (2004).
27 See, e.g., Seema Arora & Timothy N. Cason, Why Do Firms Volunteer to Exceed
Environmental Regulations? Understanding Participation in EPA's 33/50 Program, 72 LAND EcON.
413, 413-15 (1996).
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It is also unknown whether firms behave similarly across regulatory
environments. It is speculated that "bad" corporate citizens are generally bad
everywhere (e.g., securities, occupational health and safety, anti-competitive
behavior, environment) and, conversely, "good" citizens are good across the board.
But, because of data difficulties, the question generally remains empirically
unexamined. 28 In a similar vein, we have little knowledge about case processing
within and across justice systems: which cases are dropped, remanded, diverted
somewhere along the way and how do these cases compare with those that remain
in the system?
An additional lingering question is whether the field would benefit from
creating a corporate crime offending rate. Although some regulatory agencies are
interested in developing a rate-based measure, there are numerous complexities
associated with doing so.29 If one agrees that the rate should be calculated from
official data, from which reports and sources should data be used? What would
comprise the numerator and denominator of the rate measure? For what period of
time? The merits of calculating a rate-based measure can be debated, but the
practicalities of creating the measure may be overwhelming.
III. MOVING FORWARD: EVIDENCE-BASED APPROACHES AND VIGNETTE STUDIES
Coupled with all the measurement difficulties in the field is an equally
troubling lack of program and policy evaluation. Consequently, we know
relatively little about the successes or failures of white-collar/corporate crime
interventions. Interventions tend to be driven by crime "debacles" such as the
savings and loan frauds in the 1980s, the securities and accounting frauds of the
1990s and early 2000s, the ongoing financial meltdown in the mortgage/financial
markets, and environmental disasters (Three Mile Island, Love Canal, Bhopal,
Exxon Valdez, and the BP oil spill in the Gulf). Critics claim that crime policies in
this area are reactive and primarily symbolic, especially when companies use the
letter of the law to create devices that effectively undermine the intent of the law
(e.g., "creative compliance").30
28 Neal Shover & Aaron S. Routhe, Environmental Crime, in 32 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A
REVIEW OF RESEARCH 321, 327-28 (Michael Tonry ed., 2005).
29 Sally S. Simpson et al., Measuring Corporate Crime, in UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE
CRIMINALITY 115, 133-34 (Michael B. Blankenship ed., 1993); Carole Gibbs & Sally S. Simpson,
Measuring Corporate Environmental Crime Rates: Progress and Problems, 51 CRIME L. & Soc.
CHANGE 87, 87 (2009).
30 Doreen McBarnett, After Enron: Corporate Governance, Creative Compliance and the Uses
of Corporate Social Responsibility 11-13 (draft paper presented at colloquium on Governing the
Corporation: Mapping the Loci of Power in Corporate Governance Design held at Queen's
University Belfast on Sept. 20-21, 2004) (on file with author).
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There is little question that regulation and control of corporate crime, in
particular, occurs in a highly politicized environment, 31 but whether the "reactive"
policies adopted during these periods are merely symbolic is an empirical question.
A well-known study conducted in the 1990s, known as the Maryland Report,
used an evidence-based approach to assess "what works, what doesn't, and what's
promising" in the area of traditional crime prevention and control." Of all the
important areas in which reviews were conducted (e.g., policing, families,
communities, labor markets, corrections, schools), 33 evaluations of white-collar
and corporate crime interventions were notably absent. To make up for this
deficiency, an ongoing systematic review of corporate crime prevention and
control strategies is in progress. This assessment, however, has revealed few
systematic studies that can inform evidence-based policy and practice.34 For
instance, an extensive search of ten databases using fifty-four white-collar and
corporate crime search terms produced over 58,923 unique published source hits.
Of these, only 2,730 publications contained quantitative data and were deemed
potentially relevant to the subject of interest. After detailed review of the
remaining studies it was clear that, because of data limitations, few would be
eligible for a meta-analytic approach. More and better studies are needed to
assess, evaluate, and recommend policies and practices that prevent and control
white-collar/corporate crime.
In spite of the overall paucity of systematic evaluation research, there has
been a great deal of discussion and debate about the role formal sanctions play in
white-collar/corporate crime prevention and control. Much of the debate is
centered on the success (or lack thereof) of criminal justice sanctions, as
criminalization and getting tough on crime are both popular reactions to the
debacles mentioned earlier.36 Yet, this is a fairly narrow way to think about the
issue. There are multiple crime prevention strategies to consider in this discussion,
' For a discussion of mine safety regulation in the United States, see Sally S. Simpson,
Corporate Crime and Regulation, in MANAGING AND MAINTAINING COMPLIANCE 63 (Henk Elffers et
al. eds., 2006).
32 See LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, PREVENTING CRIME: WHAT
WORKS, WHAT DOESN'T, WHAT'S PROMISING vi, ix (1997).
3 See id. at v-vi.
34 Not surprisingly, low levels of research support also affect program evaluation. We have
learned a great deal about the effectiveness of drug courts, boot camps, and gun seizures but
relatively little about whether internal compliance systems prevent crime, the role of informal
controls, or which (if any) sanctions are apt to deter individuals, companies, and offer general
deterrence. See Sally S. Simpson et al., Why Did This Protocol Take Five Years? Lessons Learned
from the Campbell Corporate Crime Deterrence Project (unpublished paper presented at the 60th
Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Nov. 12-15, 2008) (on file with author).
3s Some databases were searched for more than a century (e.g., PsychInfo, 1840-2003), while
others had a significantly shorter span (e.g., Business Source Premier, 1990-2003). All searches
concluded at the end of 2003.
36 See generally SIMPSON, CORPORATE CRIME, supra note 7.
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including: Punitive (Deterrence) Models; Informal/Cooperative (Persuasion)
Models; and a Pyramid of Enforcement.37 The former is more explicitly tied to
criminal justice with its emphasis on penalties (including imprisonment) and
deterrence. Cooperative interventions focus more on shaping compliance through
a collaborative relationship between the state and regulated entity. The
enforcement pyramid emphasizes both, along with responsive regulation
strategies.
On a more positive note, however, the deterrent role of sanctions may be the
one area of white-collar crime prevention and control where there are enough
studies, using a variety of different data sources, to draw some reasonable
conclusions. Findings from this literature, however, are inconsistent. Based on
their interviews with nursing home executives, Braithwaite and Makkai declare
deterrence (measured using subjective utility models) to be a stark failure. 3 9 They
also note that sanction threats operate differently depending on individual-level
traits such as emotionality. 40 Klepper and Nagin, on the other hand, are more
optimistic about deterrence-based policies. 4 1 In their study of tax-noncompliance
(survey-based methodology), they find sanction tipping points that shift potential
offenders toward compliance.
My research in this area (using factorial surveys which combine hypothetical
offending scenarios with traditional survey techniques) has found the relationship
between legal sanctions and behavior to be mediated and moderated by individual
and firm-level factors.42 Managers appear to take both their own risks and those of
the company into account when contemplating illegal actions.43 For instance,
respondents generally believe that the company is the most likely recipient of
punishment but individual-level sanctions are seen as more consequential." Both
appear to deter offending likelihood, but formal sanction effects can pale in the
context of informal sanctions.45 Scholars also suggest that elements of procedural
3 IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 4-6, 19-53 (1992).
3 Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen & Christine Parker, Testing Responsive Regulation in Regulatory
Enforcement, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 376, 378-79 (2009).
3 John Braithwaite & Toni Makkai, Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate
Deterrence, 25 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 7,24-29 (1991).
40 Toni Makkai & John Braithwaite, The Dialectics of Corporate Deterrence, 31 J. RES.
CRIME& DELINQ. 347, 358-64 (1994).
41 Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, Tax Compliance and Perceptions ofthe Risks ofDetection
and Criminal Prosecution, 23 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 209,236-39 (1989).
42 Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing
a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 549, 579 (1996); N. Craig
Smith, Sally S. Simpson & Chun-Yao Huang, Why Managers Fail to Do the Right Thing: An
Empirical Study of Unethical and Illegal Conduct, 17 Bus. ETHICS Q. 633, 651-53 (2007).
43 Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 42, at 579.
4 Id.
45 SIMPSON, CORPORATE CRIME, supra note 7, at 106-07.
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justice and organizational legitimacy (authorities and rules) may affect whether
sanctions inhibit,46 or increase offending risk (e.g., defiance). 47 Tom Tyler, for
instance, has argued that compliance will be greatest when "people believe that the
rules of their organization are legitimate, and hence ought to be obeyed, and/or that
the values defining the organization are more congruent with their own moral
values, leading people to feel that they ought to support the organization." 48
At the company (or aggregate) level, there is some evidence that sanction
certainty and severity produce both general and specific deterrence. 49 Yet, other
studies challenge the deterrence framework.so It is likely that disparate results are
a function of the origins and consequences of the type of legal sanctions levied and
how deterrence is measured (e.g., behavior of individuals/firms, pricing of
products, counts of occupational accidents, oil spills, and so on). Simpson and
Koper, following a group of antitrust offenders over time, found marginal support
for a specific deterrence effect related to changes in antitrust penalties (i.e., shifts
in the severity of sanction from misdemeanor to felony).5' More generally,
however, Simpson and Koper found no specific deterrent effect for criminal or
civil sanctions. 52 Both had counterintuitive positive and significant effects on re-
offending. Only regulatory interventions had a negative (but insignificant)
relationship with recidivism.5 4  This is in contrast to other studies where civil
sanctions (especially class action suits) seem to be a more important source of
crime inhibition than other types.
Crime inhibition through formal sanctions may vary by offense or findings
may be associated with a particular kind of research design. A recent longitudinal
46 Margaret Levi & Audrey Sacks, Legitimating Beliefs: Sources and Indicators, 3 REG. &
GOvERNANCE 311, 314, 317 (2009).
47 Lawrence W. Sherman, Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A Theory of the Criminal
Sanction, 30 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 445, 448-49, 452, 458 (1993).
48 Tom R. Tyler, Self-Regulatory Approaches to White-Collar Crime: The Importance of
Legitimacy and Procedural Justice, in THE CRIMINOLOGY OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 195, 202 (Sally
S. Simpson & David Weisburd eds., 2009); see also Sally S. Simpson et al., To Punish or Persuade:
Redux 6 (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
49 JAY P. SHIMSHACK, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, MONITORING, ENFORCEMENT &
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE: UNDERSTANDING SPECIFIC & GENERAL DETERRENCE 10-18 (2007);
Wayne B. Gray & Jay P. Shimshack, The Effectiveness of Environmental Monitoring and
Enforcement: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, REv. ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y (forthcoming) (Oct.
2010 unpublished manuscript on file with author).
so Simpson, Gamer & Gibbs, supra note 7.
s' Sally S. Simpson & Christopher S. Koper, Deterring Corporate Crime, 30 CRIMINOLOGY
347, 356, 360 (1992).
52 Id.
5 Id.
ss See Michael Kent Block, Frederick Carl Nold & Joseph Gregory Sidak, The Deterrent
Effect ofAntitrust Enforcement, 89 J. POL. EcoN. 429, 443-44 (1981).
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(but cross-sectional) study of EPA violations and sanctions found "little evidence
of a deterrent effect" for any kind of sanction on recidivism (formal/informal,
criminal/civil/regulatory).56 However, a panel analysis of Occupational Safety and
Health Administration data showed a negative relationship between past crime and
future offending when the relationship was modeled dynamically (within company
change).57  When cross-sectional analysis techniques were utilized, there was a
positive relationship between past and current offending (controlling for
differences in inspections over time).58 Thus, cross-sectional studies may be less
likely to find deterrent effects than longitudinal analyses that can model within
individual or organizational change over time.
Although the results are far from conclusive, the deterrence literature has
raised a number of important issues that require more scientific investigation.
First, do formal legal sanctions affect corporate offending and, if so, are some
types of sanctions more effective and for whom? Is there a tipping point? Second,
what is the relationship between individual and company characteristics, the kinds
of sanctions delivered, and recidivism? Third, how do deterrence and compliance
fit together in a prevention and enforcement regulatory scheme? Does legitimacy
of the sanctioning authority (state and/or company) matter? Fourth, are results
sensitive to unit of analysis, sample type, research design, and type of data
analysis?
IV. NEW AND PROMISING RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
One area that should add to our knowledge of white-collar crime is the new
research focus on "foreclosures and crime." The National Institute of Justice
recently solicited research proposals that link mortgage fraud to neighborhood
foreclosures and traditional crime. Of particular interest is the relationship
between mortgage fraud, high levels of foreclosures (especially within certain
communities), and property and violent crime within those communities.
Linking white-collar crime to neighborhood disorder and street crime is, to
my mind, an interesting and intriguing nexus. Therefore, I conclude my remarks
with a discussion of how an old way of thinking about white-collar crime
("criminogenic tiers") and a revitalized way of looking at social connections
(network analysis) may yield interesting insights with important policy
implications.
56 Simpson, Garner & Gibbs, supra note 7, at 2.
57 Sally S. Simpson & Natalie Schell, Persistent Heterogeneity or State Dependence? An
Analysis of Occupational Safety and Health Act Violations, in THE CRIMINOLOGY OF WHITE-COLLAR
CRIME 63, 72-73 (Sally S. Simpson & David Weisburd eds., 2009).
58 id
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A. Criminogenic Tiers
Beginning with Sutherland, research consistently has shown that some
industries are more criminogenic than others and that structural characteristics-
especially those related to the political and economic environment of the market-
are critical factors associated with white-collar offending. 59 This view is in
contrast to the idea (more common in finance or economics) that markets will be
self-correcting without intervention.o
In the 1970s, sociologists used qualitative "case study" methods to examine
how the structure of markets/industries increased the risk of crime. Leonard and
Weber, for example, used the term criminogenic market to refer to occupational
crime that emerged as a direct consequence of a legally established market
structure. Denzin62 studied the liquor industry, and Farberman63 the automobile
industry, to uncover the structural relationships that affected and constrained actors
(both individuals and companies) within the market hierarchy.
This approach assumes that industry actors are both interdependent and
autonomous at the same time. Structural power rests primarily at the top of the
distribution chain. Consequently, pressures and constraints mainly are pushed
downward, but not exclusively so.6 This process, whereby pressures at one
structural level affect others, is known as a "criminogenic tier."
For Farberman, the key structural relationships in the auto industry included
the manufacturers, wholesalers, new and used car dealers, and car
buyers/purchasers.6 6 Denzin identified five tiers in the liquor industry (suppliers,
distributors, retailers, customers, and regulators). Each tier is situated in a
5 See generally SUTHERLAND, supra note 2; see also Simpson, Decomposition of Antitrust,
supra note 7. A more recent example can be found in Robert Tillman, Making the Rules and
Breaking the Rules: The Political Origins of Corporate Corruption in the New Economy, 51 CRIME
L. & Soc. CHANGE 73 (2009).
6 See Michael Clarke, Do Markets Produce Crime?, 3 INT'L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 125, 125
(1994).
61 William N. Leonard & Marvin Glenn Weber, Automakers and Dealers: A Study of
Criminogenic Market Forces, 4 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 407, 408-10 (1970).
62 See generally Norman K. Denzin, Notes on the Criminogenic Hypothesis: A Case Study of
the American Liquor Industry, 42 AM. Soc. REv. 905 (1977).
63 See generally Harvey A. Farberman, A Criminogenic Market Structure: The Automobile
Industry, 16 Soc. Q. 438 (1975).
6 Denzin, supra note 62, at 916, notes that liquor retailers have a fair amount of power and
autonomy in the distribution network, even though they are further down the market structure than
distributors.
65 Id. at 913.
6 Farberman, supra note 63, at 438-39, 455-56.
67 Denzin, supra note 62, at 906.
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competitive environment with its own distinct characteristics and pressures.6' For
instance, in the liquor industry, suppliers are a hostile and highly competitive
bunch, geographically clustered in family owned companies.69 Their main goal is
to increase sales and market expansion using advertising and target marketing.70
The top of the chain in the automobile industry is much less competitive. At the
time Farberman was writing, four companies controlled 92% of the new car
market.7 1 This near monopoly gave the auto makers a tremendous amount of
power vis-1-vis wholesalers, new car dealers, and used car retailers.72 Not
coincidently, it also granted political influence over economic policy and rules
that, according to Tillman, give rise to "the creation of motivations and
opportunities for corporate corruption."73
A central theme in this literature is that pressures and constraints that affect
one level will affect other levels in a manner similar to squeezing a balloon.74
Different kinds of occupational crime emerge at different levels in response to the
motivations and opportunities for crime. Manufacturers, for instance, need to
move unpopular products. They might restrict access to more successful product
lines until the franchise dealers or retailers agree to take more of the unpopular
one. Keeping the unpopular product is costly to the retailer, especially when it sits
in inventory and takes up space in showrooms or display shelves. To move the
product, retailers will often attempt to sell the item at bargain prices. But, that is
costly to the bottom line. In an effort to keep profits up, retailers might squeeze
their customers through the illegal tying of products, fraudulent repairs in their
service department (in the case of automobiles), or selling liquor to illicit
customers (underage drinkers).
The approach described above adopts the notion that normal market processes
produce pressures or strains that are linked to crime. Markets, however, may be
rigidly structured or loosely coupled. Criminogenic processes may be crime-
coercive (illegal behavior is directly linked to corporate profits and desired by top
managers) or crime-facilitative (structural conditions that favor crime are allowed
to exist).75
With these ideas in mind, how does a criminogenic tier analysis help us think
about mortgage fraud, foreclosures and traditional crime? The home mortgage
industry can be understood as a vertically structured market that deals in financial
instead of physical products (such as automobiles). Most Americans either have a
68 Id at 909-17.
69 Id at 909.
70 See id. at 909, 914-15.
n Farberman, supra note 63, at 439 n.2.
72 Id
7 Tillman, supra note 59, at 74.
74 See Farberman, supra note 63, at 456.
7s Martin L. Needleman & Carolyn Needleman, Organizational Crime: Two Models of
Criminogenesis, 20 Soc. Q. 517, 517-18, 520-21, 525-26 (1979).
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mortgage or live in a home or apartment that is mortgaged; thus, it follows that
mortgages are an essential product in the United States and most western
76
societies.
B. Structure of the Tiers
Home buyers are at the bottom of the market structure with lenders above
them, investment banks atop them, and a number of other players within each
level. For instance, credit raters and credit insurers evaluate the securities that
investment banks are selling and investors purchase those securities. Developers
work with commercial banks or mortgage brokers to get funds to purchase and
refurbish properties. Real estate agents work directly with the buyer or developer
as does the appraiser (who may be affiliated with agents or lenders).n
The mortgage industry is not as tightly integrated as some of the oligopoly
industries (like automobile manufacturing). But, historically the mortgage market
tended to have more layers of regulation than the physical product market-
brokers were regulated by the states, banks by state and federal governments,
credit raters by the federal government, and so forth. Under regular or typical
market conditions, a variety of occupational frauds occurred in this market (e.g.,
buyers misstating assets or the property flipping schemes depicted in Figure I
below), but criminogenesis appears tied to one's membership in or contact with the
mortgage market.79  In the context of a new loan vehicle-the subprime
mortgage-the level of regulatory oversight shifted and the market gave rise to
extraordinary profit opportunities.o
The subprime mortgage market emerged out of a lax and/or ineffective
regulatory market. Housing appreciation (in some places as high as 20% per year)
coupled with low interest rates created an attractive investment market along with
opportunities for new mortgage products with a different, riskier population
76 Thanks to Harold Barnett for this observation.
77 See generally L. Randall Wray, Lessons from the Subprime Meltdown (The Levy Econ.
Inst. of Bard Coll., Working Paper No. 522, 2007), available at
http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_522.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2011); Harold C. Barnett, And
Some With a Fountain Pen: The Securitization of Mortgage Fraud (Nov. 4, 2009) (unpublished paper
presented to the American Society of Criminology in Philadelphia, Pa.), available at
http://mortgagemarketconsultant.com/mortgagefraud-asc.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
78 For a general history of banking in the United States and bank regulation, see generally
William G. Shepherd, The Banking Industry, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 334 (Walter
Adams ed., 5th ed. 1977) and Steven Pilloff, The Banking Industry, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRY 265 (James W. Brock ed., 12th ed. 2009). See also Wray, supra note 77.
7 See Needleman & Needleman, supra note 75, at 520-22.
so See Donald Palmer & Michael Maher, A Normal Accident Analysis of the Mortgage
Meltdown, in MARKETS ON TRIAL: THE ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF THE U.S. FINANCIAL CRISIs: PART A
219, 247 (Michael Loundsbury & Paul M. Hirsch eds., 2010).
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targeted (those with no or less than optimal credit history).8' The loans, which
carried with them high origination fees, higher than conventional mortgage rates,
pre-payment penalties, and other (often hidden) costs, allowed many people who
would not normally meet the criteria for a conventional mortgage to qualify for a
subprime loan.82 In addition, if borrowers already owned a home, they were
encouraged to refinance for cash (also for high fees) and use their equity for other
purchases or to reduce financial obligations (such as reducing credit card debt)-in
83
essence to treat their homes like their own personal ATM machine.
From 1993-99, there was a ten-fold increase in the number of subprime loans
reported under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act.M Although subprime
mortgages constituted a relatively small percent of all mortgages,85 they were
associated with high risks of fraud. Data collected by the FBI reveals that the
"subprime share of outstanding loans ... more than doubled since 2003 putting a
greater share of loans at higher risk of failure. Additionally, during 2007 there
were more than 2.2 million foreclosure filings reported on approximately 1.29
million properties nationally, up 75 percent from 2006."" Between 1997 and
2005, there was a 1,411% increase in the number of suspicious activity reports
(SARs) that identified potential mortgage fraud.
The mortgage boom, and in particular the subprime market, brought many
opportunities for predatory lending, inviting agents, appraisers, developers, and
lenders to participate in multiple fraud schemes "for profit."89  Fraud for profit
includes appraisal fraud, fraudulent flipping, straw buyers, and identity theft.90 The
8 See generally Gilbert Geis, How Greed Started the Dominoes Falling: The Great American
Economic Meltdown, FRAUD MAG., Nov./Dec. 2009, at 21; see also Brian Davis, OFHEO Report:
US. House Price Appreciation Rate Steadies (Mar. 11, 2007), http://appraisalnewsonline
.typepad.com/appraisal newsfor reale/2007/03/ofheo report_us.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2011)
(observing housing appreciation as high as 20% per year in certain areas of Los Angeles).
82 Palmer & Maher, supra note 80, at 236-37.
83 See Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy: Financial Crisis Symposium, 6 RUTGERS J. L.
& PUB. PO'Y 926, 931 (2009).
8 Allen Fishbein & Harold Bunce, U.S. DEP'T Hous. & URBAN DEv., Subprime Market
Growth and Predatory Lending, in HOUSING POLICY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS 273, 274 (Susan M. Wachter & R. Leo Penne eds., 2001), available at
http://www.huduser.org/portal/publications/pdf/brd/1 3Fishbein.pdf.
85 Barnett, supra note 77, at 2.
86 See 2007 Mortgage Fraud Report, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Apr. 2008),
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/mortgage-fraud-2007 (noting under "Key Findings"
that "[t]he downward trend in the housing market provid[ed] an ideal climate for mortgage fraud
perpetrators to employ a myriad of schemes suitable to a down market").
87 id
88 Mortgage Loan Fraud: An Industry Assessment Based upon Suspicious Activity Report
Analysis, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, I (Nov. 2006), http://www.fincen.gov
/news room/rp/reports/pdf/MortgageLoanFraud.pdf
8 Id. at 3.
9 Id.
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low "teaser" rates associated with the subprime market were attractive instruments
for fraud, especially in the context of rapidly appreciating housing values (see
Figure 1).
Figure 1: Illegal Property Flipping Scheme't
Figure 1: Illegal Poperty Flipping Scheme
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As market conditions changed, the political environment shifted as well.
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were allowed to treat high risk subprime mortgages
as meeting their mission of making housing affordable to nontraditional buyers
(low income).92 In fact, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) required that Freddie and Fannie purchase even more of these loans by
allowing the government chartered (but privately owned) mortgage finance firms
to "count billions of dollars they invested in subprime loans as a public good that
would foster affordable housing." Almost half of all U.S. mortgages are financed
by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and, as of 2008, the two government subsidized
firms held almost $5.3 trillion in outstanding debt.94
On the purchaser side, as the new products no longer required verification of
income, buyers were encouraged to lie about their assets and misstate income.9
This and other kinds of frauds for property (including occupancy fraud, debt
elimination, straw buyers, and identity theft) involved both legitimate and illicit
96buyers. This kind of fraud is referred to as fraud for property.
Telephones and the Internet (on-line applications), coupled with the
development of automated risk assessment instruments, contributed to fraud
opportunities. 97  These instruments (e.g., no document loans) were used to
91 Mortgage Fraud Report 2006, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (May 2007),
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/mortgage-fraud-2006/2006-mortgage-fraud-report.
92 Carol D. Leonnig, How HUD Mortgage Policy Fed the Crisis, WASH. POST, June 10, 2008,
at Al.
SId
94 Id.
9 Mortgage Fraud Report 2006, supra note 91.
96 Id
9 Mortgage Loan Fraud: An Industry Assessment Based upon Suspicious Activity Report
Analysis, supra note 88, at 5.
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determine if the consumer could meet the initial loan conditions (without taking
into account such factors as this population's increased risk of illness,
unemployment, or loss of income). Because income was no longer verified, and
many consumers misstated their income, the old adage "garbage in, garbage out"
meant that people who really should not have qualified for the mortgages did, but
were then unable to make payments, especially when the new Adjusted Rate
Mortgage kicked in and the housing bubble burst.99 Home values tumbled, equity
disappeared, and people lost their jobs, increasing the risk of foreclosure-which
brought about a whole new kind of fraudulent activity: foreclosure rescue
frauds.tto
Because subprime lending was concentrated in low-income and minority
neighborhoods, foreclosures hit these communities the hardest.' 0' Communities
least able to absorb the foreclosures and abandoned properties have been the most
affected by the housing collapse.'02 Foreclosed homes are more apt to remain
empty in these neighborhoods as the number of eligible buyers shrink.10 3
Properties are abandoned, vandalized, and are attractive for illicit activities (e.g.,
safe houses for drugs and human trafficking).
In Phoenix, for instance, the housing boom attracted investors who bought
and rented houses while waiting for a chance to flip them"'" When the mortgage
market started to decline in mid-2007, the number of rental homes in the Phoenix
area increased approximately seventy-five percent from the number of rentals in
2000.0 In addition to a new, riskier type of renter, the declining market and
subsequent foreclosures gave rise to community "dead zones"-concentrated areas
98 See id.
9 See Barnett, supra note 77, at 17-18.
'" For example, loan modification fraud. See 2009 Mortgage Fraud Report "Year in
Review," FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/mortgage-
fraud-2009 (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
101 A study of Chicago lending practices found "that a dual mortgage market existed. . . .
Mainstream lenders active in White and upper income neighborhoods were much less active in low-
income and minority neighborhoods-effectively leaving these neighborhoods to unregulated
subprime lenders." Fishbein & Bunce, supra note 84, at 274 (discussing DANIEL IMMERGLUCK &
MARTI WILES, WOODSTOCK INST., Two STEPS BACK: THE DUAL MORTGAGE MARKET, PREDATORY
LENDING, AND THE UNDOING OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (1999)).
102 Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The Impact ofSingle-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on
Neighborhood Crime, 21 Hous. STUDIES 851, 854 (2006).
1o3 Id.
'04 Joel Millman, Immigrants Become Hostages as Gangs Prey on Mexicans, WALL. ST. J.,
June 10, 2009, at Al.
105 id.
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of foreclosed and abandoned properties.106 Under these conditions, criminologists
expect neighborhood crime to increase-even in suburban neighborhoods. 1 ?
Although the mechanisms through which neighborhood crime is linked to
mortgage fraud are not well-conceptualized or empirically linked, a number of
different explanations seem reasonable (e.g., broken windows, self-control, general
strain, disorganization/social control). 08 The effects of fraud on crime likely will
depend on both the type of neighborhood in which fraud and foreclosures are
concentrated and who is living in that community (i.e., the social and personal
costs of loan default and foreclosures). 0 9 Such characteristics are also apt to
influence the type of crime that occurs (property versus violent crime; street
violence versus domestic violence). Finally, it is important to recognize that fraud
and its consequences are dynamic processes. Foreclosures that occur as a
consequence of fraud and other questionable activities, such as predatory lending,
occur in a time and space continuum. Specifying the causal relationships between
foreclosures and crime must disentangle complex neighborhood processes (e.g.,
physical and social disorder).
Subprime products were very popular on Wall Street. Investment banks were
highly competitive with one another to package and bundle high risk mortgages
with other investments and sell them to investors. The trick was to pass on to
investors the risk of delinquency and default carried by the toxic assets in a form
that was not perceived to be risky while often at the same time, hedging or betting
against the products' appreciation and value (e.g., Goldman Sachs). The
investment banks, in a sense, played both sides against the middle. They
channeled money to wholesalers and direct sources of funds (the lenders) in order
to reap the financial benefits from the loans and then packaged and enhanced the
mortgages for sale to investors.'10
Subsequent problems in the housing industry and credit markets cannot be
laid at the feet of a few bad apples. Insiders argue that criminogenic activities
were systemic and extensive, up and down the market structure."' As Mark
Zandi, senior economist at Moody's Economy.com, suggests, "the causes of the
credit problems are very broad-based . . . . [E]veryone was involved to some
0 Id.
107 See, e.g., Ralph B. Taylor, Potential Models for Understanding Crime Impacts of High or
Increasing Unoccupancy Rates in Unexpected Places, and How to Prevent Them (Mar. 31-Apr. 1,
2009) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the National Institute of Justice Meeting on Home
Foreclosures and Crime), available at http://www.rbtaylor.net/unoccupancyimpacts.pdf.
108 See, e.g., id.
' Immergluck & Smith, supra note 102, at 860.
110 See Barnett, supra note 77; Geis, supra note 81; Palmer & Maher, supra note 80.
111 See John W. Schoen, Mortgage Fraud Sweep Marks a Turning Point: Widespread FBI
Probe Highlights Breadth and Scope of Lending Crime, MSNBC (June 19, 2008, 8:10 PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25269190/ns/business-personal-finance.
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degree or another-borrower, lender, investment banker-all the way top to
bottom.""12
The short story is this: Wall Street, in its thirst to increase profits,
discovered the subprime residential business and embarked on a liquidity
spree by providing warehouse lines of credit to too many
undercapitalized subprime lenders. The Street-Bear Steams, Lehman
Brothers, Merrill Lynch, take your pick-funded these companies and
then turned around and securitized their loans. The reason for the fall:
loan quality. Wall Street and the wholesalers feeding them product
threw residential mortgage standards out the window. This may sound
like a gross over exaggeration, but during the 'boom' years just about
any loan applicant with a pulse could obtain a mortgage, be it stated-
income, alt-A, payment options ARMs, and various other nontraditional
loan types. (Note: Bear and Lehman are now dead. See what happens
when you play with fire?)' 13
The overall structure of the mortgage market and its relationship to
neighborhood foreclosures, with links to traditional property and violent crime, is
summarized below in Figure 2. The key market relationships discussed above are
depicted (buyers, mortgage brokers, investment banks, credit raters, and investors),
as well as other less central players (appraisers and real estate agents).
Figure 2114
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112 id
11 Paul Muolo, The Worst of Times, The Best of Times (Oct. 23, 2009, 11:26 PM),
http://paul.realestateloans.com/paul-muolo/2009/10/23/the-worst-of-times-the-best-of-times.html.
114 Adopted from Wray, supra note 77, and information provided in Barnett, supra note 77,
and Palmner & Maher, supra note 80.
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C. Network Analysis
A criminogenic tier analysis can identify the key structural relationships
among players in the mortgage market, up and down the hierarchy and within
levels. It can assess the economic, political, and cultural environments in which
the actors operated and isolate the particular pressures, constraints, and
opportunities that both coerced and facilitated fraudulent activity at all levels of the
industry. However, the criminogenic tier approach is a conceptual analytic
framework. It does not statistically link actors to one another or allow researchers
to assess the density of networks or the centrality of certain actors to others. This
is where network analysis is useful.
Network analysis, focused on the actors within a criminogenic market, can
visually represent the structural roles of the market participants, their actions, the
transaction flows and transfer of resources between points, and physical distances
between actors.' 15 It can focus on a particular actor, node, point, or agent and
pinpoint the type of tie among actors. Actors can be analyzed in a dyad, triad,
subgroup, or group.116 In this way, network analysis provides insight into the
relations between elements (the structure) instead of focusing on the specific
attributes of the individual elements." 7
Network analysis can be used to test a variety of different theories that may
provide insight into mortgage fraud, such as the strength of weak ties, transaction
costs, opportunity theory, social exchange theory, contagion theories, and so on." 8
Research has shown, for instance, that mortgage fraud risk moved in waves across
the country from east to west.1 9 States identified with the highest levels of
foreclosures "correspond closely" with states with the highest overall levels of
mortgage fraud risk.120 Thus, there are fraud hotspots that might be particularly
amenable to network analysis. The extent to which analyses could identify weak
ties that appear to control information might prove useful for policy interventions,
as would a focus on the density and extent of control networks (e.g., regulation).
Tracking networks over time may show how new opportunities (such as the
emergence of subprime mortgages or changes in regulation) influence the
composition of network actors and their relationships. Tillman and Indergaard
"s See generally Valdis Krebs, Social Network Analysis: A Brief Introduction,
http://www.orgnet.com/sna.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
116 STANLEY WASSERMAN & KATHERINE FAUST, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: METHODS AND
APPLICATIONS 92-165 (1994).
"7 Jean Marie McGloin & David S. Kirk, Social Network Analysis, in HANDBOOK OF
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 209, 209 (Alex R. Piquero & David Weisburd eds., 2009).
'18 See Peter R Monge & Noshir S. Contractor, Emergence of Communication Networks, in
THE NEW HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION 440 (Fredric M. Jablin & Linda L.
Putnam eds., 2001).
"9 Q3 2009 MORTGAGE FRAUD RISK REPORT, INTERTHINX, INC., 2 (2009),
http://www.interthinx.com/pdf/09_Q3MFRIFNL.pdf.
120 id.
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remind us that transformations in the corporate landscape can alter the structure of
criminogenic tiers, broadening the network of fraudsters to include players from
outside the primary market. 121
Baker and Faulkner's analysis of the great electrical price-fixing conspiracies
demonstrates the utility of network analysis to test theory and analyze white-collar
offending, with a focus on both individual and organizational actors. 12 2 Their study
reveals "that the structure of illegal networks is driven primarily by the need to
maximize concealment, rather than the need to maximize efficiency."1 23 Illegal
networks are different from legal ones in that the former rely on secrecy.
Information must be transferred quickly, discretely, and accurately. Legal network
theory suggests that in order to do this, the network should be sparse and
decentralized as this would offer better protection from investigation and
sanctioning.124 Organizations in this type of network should have low rates of
conspirators who will be found guilty, and if found guilty will have shorter
sentences and lower fines.125
Most of Baker and Faulkner's results were inconsistent with their original
hypotheses.12 6 For instance, decentralization did not protect against successful
prosecution and people who were centralized were less likely (rather than more
likely) to be found guilty.12 7 The study is, however, an excellent description of
criminogenic networks within three electrical markets, the structure of those
networks, and linking structural characteristics to outcomes. This approach,
assuming the availability of relevant information to construct the network,12 8 offers
great utility for exploring the mortgage fraud industry, key actors and
relationships, ties among them, and how the network is linked to foreclosures and
neighborhood crime.
This paper began with a discussion of the various deficiencies in our
understanding of white-collar crime. As we move toward collecting and utilizing
better data to study the phenomenon, there will be better systematic research in this
area-focused on both the causes of crime and its prevention and control. A
121 Robert Tillman & Michael Indergaard, Corporate Corruption in the New Economy, in
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME AND CORPORATE CRIME 474, 482-85 (Henry
N. Pontell & Gilbert Geis eds., 2007). They coin the term "criminogenic institutional frameworks" to
capture the broader spectrum of participants in the construction of a crime-facilitative environment.
Id. at 482.
122 Wayne E. Baker & Robert R. Faulkner, The Social Organization of Conspiracy: Illegal
Networks in the Heavy Electrical Equipment Industry, 58 AM. Soc. REv. 837 (1993).
123 Id. at 837 (emphasis omitted).
124 Id. at 853.
125 Id. at 845.
126 Id. at 850-51, 855.
127 Id at 851.
128 See generally MATTHEw H. FLEMING, FIN. SERVS. AuTHoRTrrY, FSA's SCALE & IMPACT OF
FINANCIAL CRIME PROJECT (PHASE ONE): CRITICAL ANALYSIS (2009), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/occpapers/op37.pdf.
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criminogenic tier approach has the utility to link individual and organization actors
in a network of interdependent relationships. Network analysis can then depict
those relationships in a variety of useful ways-for theory development and policy
interventions.
